Production Targets

We present a dynamic quantity setting game, where players may continuously adjust their quantity targets, but incur convex adjustment costs when they do so. These costs allow players to use quantity targets as a partial commitment device. We show that the equilibrium path of such a game is hump-shaped and that the final equilibrium outcome is more competitive than its static analog. We then test the theory using monthly production targets of the Big Three U.S. auto manufacturers during 1965-1995 and show that the hump-shaped dynamic pattern is present in the data. Initially, production targets steadily increase until they peak about 2-3 months before production. Then, they gradually decline to eventual production levels. This qualitative pattern is fairly robust across a range of similar exercises. We conclude that strategic considerations play a role in the planning phase in the auto industry, and that static models may therefore under-estimate the industry's competitiveness.

Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice

We use a large data set of deductible choices in auto insurance contracts to estimate the distribution of risk preferences in our sample. To do so, we develop a structural econometric model, which accounts for adverse selection by allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in both risk (probability of an accident) and risk aversion. Ex-post claim information separately identifies the marginal distribution of risk, while the joint distribution of risk and risk aversion is identified by the deductible choice. We find that individuals in our sample have on average an estimated absolute risk aversion which is higher than other estimates found in the literature. Using annual income as a measure of wealth, we find an average two-digit coefficient of relative risk aversion. We also find that women tend to be more risk averse than men, that proxies for income and wealth are positively related to absolute risk aversion, that unobserved heterogeneity in risk preferences is higher relative to that of risk, and that unobserved risk is positively correlated with unobserved risk aversion. Finally, we use our results for counterfactual exercises that assess the profitability of insurance contracts under various assumptions.

The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market

Much of the extensive empirical literature on insurance markets has focused on whether adverse selection can be detected. Once detected, however, there has been little attempt to quantify its importance. We start by showing theoretically that the efficiency cost of adverse selection cannot be inferred from reduced form evidence of how "adversely selected" an insurance market appears to be. Instead, an explicit model of insurance contract choice is required. We develop and estimate such a model in the context of the U.K. annuity market. The model allows for private information about risk type (mortality) as well as heterogeneity in preferences over different contract options. We focus on the choice of length of guarantee among individuals who are required to buy annuities. The results suggest that asymmetric information along the guarantee margin reduces welfare relative to a first-best, symmetric information benchmark by about £127 million per year, or about 2 percent of annual premiums. We also find that government mandates, the canonical solution to adverse selection problems, do not necessarily improve on the asymmetric information equilibrium. Depending on the contract mandated, mandates could reduce welfare by as much as £107 million annually, or increase it by as much as £127 million. Since determining which mandates would be welfare improving is empirically difficult, our findings suggest that achieving welfare gains through mandatory social insurance may be harder in practice than simple theory may suggest.

Liquidity Constraints and Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending

We present new evidence on consumer liquidity constraints and the credit market conditions that might give rise to them. Our analysis is based on unique data from a large auto sales company that serves the subprime market. We first document the role of short-term liquidity in driving purchasing behavior, including sharp increases in demand during tax rebate season and a high sensitivity to minimum down payment requirements. We then explore the informational problems facing subprime lenders. We find that default rates rise significantly with loan size, providing a rationale for lenders to impose loan caps because of moral hazard. We also find that borrowers at the highest risk of default demand the largest loans, but the degree of adverse selection is mitigated substantially by effective risk-based pricing.

Is Hanukkah responsive to Christmas?

We study the extent to which religious activity responds to the presence and activity of other religions. Specifcally, we employ individual-level survey data and county-level expenditure data to examine the extent to which Hanukkah celebration among U.S. Jews is driven by the presence of Christmas. We find that: (1) Jews with children at home are more likely to celebrate Hanukkah than Jews without children. (2) The effect of having children on Hanukkah celebrations is higher for reform Jews than for orthodox Jews; and, it is higher for Jews who feel a stronger sense of belonging to Judaism. (3) Jewish-related expenditures in Hanukkah are higher in counties with lower share of Jews. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that Jews increase religious activity during Hanukkah because of the presence of Christmas, and this response is primarily driven by the presence of children at home. One underlying motivator might be that Jewish parents in the U.S. celebrate Hanukkah more intensively so heir children do not feel left out, and/or because they are concerned that their children will convert or intermarry.Religions, Hanukkah, Identity

Not-So-Classical Measurement Errors: A Validation Study of Homescan

We report results from a validation study of Nielsen Homescan data. We use data from a large grocery chain to match thousands of individual transactions that were recorded by both the retailer (at the store) and the Nielsen Homescan panelist (athome). First, we report how often shopping trips are not reported, and how often trip information, product information, price, and quantity are reported with error. We focus on recording errors in prices, which are more prevalent, and show that they can be classified to two categories, one due to standard recording errors, the other due to how Nielsen constructs the price data. We then show how the validation data can be used to correct the impact of recording errors on estimates obtained from Nielsen Homescan data. We use a simple application to illustrate the impact of recording errors as well as the ability to correct for these errors. The application suggests that while recording errors are present, and potentially impact results, corrections, like the one we employ, can be adopted by users of Homescan data to investigate the robustness of their results.Measurement Error, Validation Study, Self-Reported Data

Estimating Welfare in Insurance Markets Using Variation in Prices

We show how standard consumer and producer theory can be used to estimate welfare in insurance markets with selection. The key observation is that the same price variation needed to identify the demand curve also identifies how costs vary as market participants endogenously respond to price. With estimates of both the demand and cost curves, welfare analysis is straight forward. We illustrate our approach by applying it to the employee health insurance choices at Alcoa, Inc. We detect adverse selection in this setting but estimate that its quantitative welfare implications are small, and not obviously remediable by standard public policy tools.asymmetric information, adverse selection, health insurance, effciency cost

On the Accuracy of Nielsen Homescan Data

Researchers use Nielsen Homescan data, which provide detailed food-purchase information from a panel of U.S. households, to address a variety of important research topics. However, some question the credibility of the data since the data are self-recorded and the recording process is time-consuming. Matching purchase records from 2004 Homescan data with data obtained from a large grocery retailer, it is evident that quantities purchased are reported more accurately in Homescan than are prices. Many of the price differences may be driven by the way Nielsen imputes prices: when available, Nielsen uses store-level prices instead of the actual price paid by the household. There are also differences by household type in the tendency to make mistakes that are correlated with demographic variables. However, the fraction of variance explained by the documented recording errors is in line with other research data sets for which cross-validation studies have been conducted.Nielsen, Homescan, scanner data, validation study, Agricultural and Food Policy, Consumer/Household Economics, Demand and Price Analysis, Institutional and Behavioral Economics,

Equilibrium Demand Elasticities across Quality Segments

Empirical studies find substantial differences in demand elasticities and associated markups among products of different quality. This paper analyzes the theoretical determinants of such variation. We present a simple model that allows for horizontal and vertical differentiation and accounts for endogenous entry. We find that most economic forces in our model, such as consumers’ price sensitivity, the scope for product differentiation, and sunk costs of entry, are likely to induce lower equilibrium demand elasticities for higher quality products. In contrast, other economic forces, such as marginal cost of production and the distribution (across consumers) of the willingness to pay for quality, may induce the opposite pattern. These results provide an organizing framework through which empirical findings may be interpreted, and may also help to predict variation in demand elasticities for markets in which empirical estimates of elasticities are unavailable or infeasible to obtain.

A Model of Market Power in Customer Markets

We develop a model for studying dynamic competition in environments with frictions that lead to partial lock-in of customers to products. The dynamic aspects associated with customer retention and acquisition introduce pricing incentives that do not exist in more traditional, static product markets. The proposed model, while highly stylized, maintains certain symmetry properties that allow us to obtain equilibrium existence and uniqueness. We then study the comparative statics of the model and derive a closed-form relationship between average equilibrium markups and the Herfindahl index. We illustrate how the model can be used by analyzing mergers in such a dynamic environment.Martin Lee Johnson Graduate Fellowshi